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Wheelchair as semiotic: space governance of the American handicapped parking
space
Abstract
The wheelchair has become a stereotypical symbol of physical disability. The image may appear as a
picture, as on parking signs with a blue background and a white figure sitting in a wheelchair, or in reality
when one sees an actual person sitting in one. Both images are useful in characterising the governance of
the handicapped parking space, a field that presents a unique case study in the interpretation and
enforcement of law. The parking space is legally reserved for vehicles marked by the Blue Wheelchair
which hangs as a tag from the rearview mirror or on the licence plate; but at the same time it is socially
reserved for vehicles driven by a person who is dependent upon an actual wheelchair. Law enforces this
space formally by ticketing and/or towing violating vehicles. Society enforces this space informally
through the disciplining gaze of onlookers. Legal enforcement is based upon the presence of the Blue
Wheelchair symbol as it matches the sign that towers above the reserved spot. Social enforcement
judges and disciplines through the qualifying observation of visible disability in the form of a wheelchair.
However, what happens when a Blue Wheelchair symbol is present, but an actual wheelchair is absent?
Which source of legitimacy is treated as the more authoritative?
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Wheelchair as semiotic:
space governance of the American
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Sarah Marusek
Introduction
The wheelchair has become a stereotypical symbol of physical disability.
The image may appear as a picture, as on parking signs with a blue
background and a white figure sitting in a wheelchair, or in reality when
one sees an actual person sitting in one. Both images are useful in
characterising the governance of the handicapped parking space, a
field that presents a unique case study in the interpretation and
enforcement of law. The parking space is legally reserved for vehicles
marked by the Blue Wheelchair which hangs as a tag from the rearview
mirror or on the licence plate; but at the same time it is socially reserved
for vehicles driven by a person who is dependent upon an actual
wheelchair. Law enforces this space formally by ticketing and/or towing
violating vehicles. Society enforces this space informally through the
disciplining gaze of onlookers. Legal enforcement is based upon the
presence of the Blue Wheelchair symbol as it matches the sign that
towers above the reserved spot. Social enforcement judges and
disciplines through the qualifying observation of visible disability in
the form of a wheelchair. However, what happens when a Blue
Wheelchair symbol is present, but an actual wheelchair is absent? Which
source of legitimacy is treated as the more authoritative?
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Different as they are, both forms of governance  the formal/legal
and the informal/social  reflect the defining parameters of disability
according to the Americans with Disabilities Act 1990. The ADA defines
a person with a disability to include a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities, [having]
a record of such an impairment or, being regarded as having such an
impairment. This last part of the definition means that a person who is
regarded as disabled is disabled. But the Blue Wheelchair sign leads
people to think that being regarded as disabled requires physical
impairment and a wheelchair. So the legal criteria of being regarded as
having such an impairment in fact encourages the observing social
gaze and entrenches the stereotype of the wheelchair as the governing
semiotic which makes disability legible.
This paper explores the semiotic of the wheelchair as it is used as a
tool governing the occupancy of the handicapped parking space based
around the use of the word regard from the ADAs definition of disability.
First, the idea of regarding will be examined in terms of the disciplining
gaze which in fact governs the space both from the point of view of the
law and through the observation of onlookers (Foucault 1995). Donna
Fletchers (2001) notion of the guilt gradient will be tied to Cope et als
(1991) study of the posted sign of the Blue Wheelchair as designated
reserved space. Second, regarding is not just a site of biopolitical
governance (Foucault 1994, Rose & Valverde 1998) but one that is
contested through everyday interpretations of the language of the law
(Brigham unpublished). Lastly, the phenomenon of citizen-ticketing
demonstrates the power of practices of social enforcement on the margin
between formal and informal modes of ordering (Brigham 1996). Both
legal and informal norms demand the stereotypical image of the
wheelchair to be present, while at the same time encouraging the gaze
as the verification of disability. In conclusion, this argument will highlight
the limitations of heralding litigation as the optimal solution to disabilitybased discrimination as it prioritises formal governance over social
governance in the enforcement of parking rights (Burke 2002).
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The gaze
Drivers who park in a handicapped parking space are stared at. These
stares verify their rightful occupancy of the space by visually
determining their impairment. The disciplining gaze is a form of
surveillance that Michel Foucault (1995) calls the faceless gaze. In his
analysis of Benthams Panopticon, prisoners reside in cells without
doors detained only by their own assumptions that the guard station in
the centre of the prison is always watching .Surveillance [is] based
upon a system of permanent registration and power is visible but not
verifiable (Foucault 1995: 214, 196). In this way, the faceless gaze is the
gaze that disciplines. Foucault states that the major effect of the
Panopticon [is] to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and
permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power.
The concern is with individualizing observation, with characterization
and classification, [and] with the analytical arrangement of space (1995:
202, 201).
Thus in our case study, the faceless gaze is directed at the driver of
the occupying vehicle from onlookers constantly policing the rightful
occupancy of that space. Drivers regarded as disabled through the use
of the wheelchair are treated as rightful occupants. They will be
regarded as disabled according to the presence of an actual wheelchair.
In this way, the stereotype of the wheelchair creates a system of
permanent registration precisely in order to satisfy the moral scrutiny
of onlookers. Indeed, just as Foucault predicts, the handicapped parking
space is a type of Panopticon wherein the threat of being disciplined for
not being regarded as disabled keeps many people who are not in
wheelchairs  disabled or otherwise  from parking there. The panoptic
arrangement
programmes
the basic functioning of a society
penetrated through and through with disciplinary mechanisms (1995:
209). Indeed, the legal insignia of the Blue Wheelchair and the actual
wheelchair provide us with an example of disciplinary mechanisms that
work together. Because the image of a wheelchair is the legal sign for
disability, social surveillance is conditioned to see disability in the form
of an actual wheelchair. In this way, the qualification of being regarded
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as disabled itself depends on the gaze and the image as a source of law:
the gaze either verifies social belonging based on physical impairment
or validates or overrides the legal record of disability hanging from the
rearview mirror.
Foucault tells us that the purpose of discipline is to fix, particularly
to arrest or regulate movement (1995: 219). In the context of the parking
lot, the disciplining gaze comes to regulate the movement of drivers
themselves within the handicapped parking space. As an example of
this psychic regulation, Donna Fletcher (2001) has documented what
she refers to as the guilt gradient in the illegal use of reserved parking
spaces. Her study is based on the observation of the behaviour of
violating drivers, or those able-bodied drivers without wheelchairs. She
determines that such drivers feel the most guilty when parking in
conspicuously visible handicapped spaces. Parking in the least
conspicuous reserved space, or the handicapped parking space furthest
from the door occurred most frequently. She also unauthorised parking
practices in handicapped spaces according to a host of justifications
ranging from ignorance (didnt see the handicapped sign), laziness,
miscellaneous excuses (having a sick dog, needing to use the restroom),
to downright deceit (exiting the vehicle with a limp only until safely
inside the building). Fletcher describes the guilt gradient in relation to
threats of penalty from condemning bystanders who socially enforce
this space through the disciplining gaze or through audibly asserted
outrage. Of course, legal enforcement through possible police actions
of ticketing or towing the illegal vehicle was just as preventative as
frowns and condemning stares. She concludes that it would not hurt
to locate reserved parking spaces in conspicuous areas as the guilt
gradient is directly influenced by visibility (Fletcher 2001: 161).
The visibility of freestanding signs as a notice of reserved space,
and therefore their public nature, is more effective at keeping those who
didnt belong out than pavement markings or fines (Cope et al 1991).
Many individuals illegally using spaces reserved for the physically
disabled are aware of their non-sanctioned behavior and might
reasonably be expected to consider being seen and publicly admonished
as a punishing consequence (Cope et al 1991: 62). Connected to the
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disciplining gaze that regulates and fixes movement is the idea of
spatialisation, or the ways in which legal practices are involved in the
constitution of
governable spaces (Rose & Valverde 1998: 549).
Nikolas Rose and Mariana Valverde (1998) tell us that the spatialisation
of governable conduct directs the routines of everyday life and entail[s]
codes that embody specific conceptions of desirable and undesirable
conduct (1998: 549). The governable space of handicapped parking
combines modes of legal authorisation for disabled drivers, with (through
the ADAs definition of disability as being regarded as disabled)
procedures of social adjudication. The handicapped parking space is
likewise a governable space according to Francois Ewalds idea of social
law, law which is welded to the power of the norms (Rose & Valverde
1998: 544). This means that social law is framed by the connection
between social norms and the interpretation of those norms. Thus the
legal force that operates so powerfully in laws adoption of the image of
the wheelchair as the sign for disability derives from at the same time as
it participates in the constitution and sustenance of the social norm as
to the nature of disability. The image of the wheelchair links social to
legal justification, and formal to informal practices of enforcement.
Space is socially governed as governance is spatially articulated,
and each are legitimated by their constitutive relationship. Consider the
episode entitled The Handicapped Spot from the television sitcom
Seinfeld (episode 63 first aired 13 May 1993). Heres what happens: The
gang are patrolling a New York shopping mall for a place to park. All the
spots are taken, except for the handicapped spot. George, the driver, is
in a quandary: does he park there or not? Kramer suggests taking it, as
there are no other available spaces to be seen. Elaine disagrees, assured
that there will be available spaces in another lot. The following
conversation ensues:
George: I dont want to walk that far.
Elaine: What if a handicapped person needs it?
Kramer: Oh, come on, they dont drive!
Jerry: Yes, they do.
Kramer: Have you ever seen a handicapped person pull into a space and
park?
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Jerry: Well, there are spaces there, they must drive!
Kramer: Well they dont. If they could drive, they wouldnt be handicapped.

Elaines concern is a form of disciplined conduct, an interiorisation
of modes of surveillance. She is aware that the space is reserved for the
handicapped driver presumed to be in a wheelchair. Kramers response,
that handicapped people cant drive, is in fact a re-articulation of the
social law we have been analysing, although here it has been heightened,
for comedic purposes, until the handicapped driver takes on the form of
a paradox or oxymoron. Albeit ironically, the oxymoron reinforces the
disciplining gaze of social law by insisting that physical disability must
be visible in order to be socially legitimate. Kramer in fact highlights the
paradox of a social law that considers itself entitled to judge impairment
only on the basis of what it sees and already expects to see.

Biopolitics
The oppressive implications of this kind of paradoxical judgment is not
just a fiction. In People v James McNally (2001), James McNally, who
had parked to read a sign, parked in such way that access to three
handicapped parking spaces was blocked. Joan Binnie, a handicapped
driver who was looking to park in one of these three spaces, honked her
horn and pointed to her blue wheelchair placard hanging from her
rearview mirror. Irritated, McNally, thinking that the woman behind the
wheel was giving him the finger, called out Fuck you asshole! and
reluctantly moved his vehicle. However, after observing Binnie exit her
car without the assistance of a wheelchair, he violently yelled, You
aint no fucking gimp, I should get out and bash you! McNally visually
judged Binnie to be illegitimate in her occupancy of the space because
she was able to walk. Even though she displayed the legal qualifier of
the blue wheelchair placard and pointed to it for McNallys benefit,
McNally nonetheless based his judgment on the absence of an actual
wheelchair. Lumping together people of such diverse fates [that]
disguises the complexity of their problems (Burke 2002: 60), McNally
expected that because Binnie displayed the Blue Wheelchair placard,
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she would be in a wheelchair. Although Binnie was handicapped with
Multiple Sclerosis, McNally did not regard her as disabled. Social
norms of visibility trumped the legal semiotic of the Blue Wheelchair.
While not all disabled people look disabled, they are nonetheless
governed because of their bodies. Foucault describes the governance
of bodies as biopolitics, or the endeavor to rationalize the problems
presented to governmental practice by the phenomena characteristic of
a group of living human beings constituted as a population (1994: 202).
McNallys violent response was a kind of biopolitical governance of
Binnie.
Biopolitics disciplines in response to conduct and appearance. In
the next case, the social enforcement of the disciplining gaze is
confronted by the social enforcement that disciplines the body itself. In
Peoria, Illinois, an elderly man was violently attacked and sexually
assaulted by the same two men whom he had scolded for parking in a
handicapped zone (Cope et al 1991). Their able-bodied appearance
incited the elderly mans sense of entitlement to enforce the established
norms of social expectation. But this disciplinary gaze itself invoked an
angry response in the two men. So the word regard has dual meanings
here. The elderly man regards the lack of disabled appearance by the
two men while the two men for their part regarded the elderly man as
claiming a right to social rather than legal enforcement and violently
resisted his legal authority to do so.

Law as forum
The handicapped parking space illustrates the idea of law as forum. The
community of the parking lot is a repository of visible and invisible
structures of law that shape political life (Brigham 1996). John Brighams
notion of the law as forum involves law that operates on the surface
and law that operates in society and on our consciousness (Brigham
1996: 154). As a place where ordinary people actively interpret the
law and give it meaning as applied to them, Brigham further asserts,
what people know with reference to legal forms is a source of law
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(Brigham unpublished, 1996: 137). This means that ordinary people who
regard the occupant of the space expect to see a wheelchair because
the legal sign of disability is a picture of a wheelchair. This is law
operating on the surface. Legally, a wheelchair is present, so socially,
there must also be one. This is law operating in society and on our
consciousness. In thinking of this space in these terms, social
enforcement is mixed with legal enforcement, legal norms are interpreted
and enforced socially, and social norms are given legal authority through
social action.
If legal enforcement of this space is in the tangible form of a ticket
and social enforcement is through the intangible disciplining gaze, then
the citizen-ticket is evidence of the amalgamation and commingling of
both: the distinction between formal and informal law is by no means so
neat and clear. The citizen-ticket is a piece of paper that resembles a
legal ticket and is posted on vehicles interpreted as violators by fellow
citizens. It is law operating on the surface, rebuking drivers of vehicles
who are not regarded as disabled. What is interesting about the citizenticket is that they are frequently paid by those who receive them even
though the ticket has no formal legal status. The citizen-ticket is a form
of law operating on the consciousness of the violator and may be paid
because it so closely mimics a legal form on the one hand, and a social
judgment, on the other, that people recognise it as a source of law.
The story of Sharon White Taylor exemplifies this logic (1996).
Handicapped by a stroke, Taylor socially enforces spatial governance
in the handicapped parking space by distributing citizen-tickets. Her
mission is to increase awareness of its non-handicapped exploitation
by drivers not in wheelchairs. She regulates the space by waging a
campaign against the able-bodied who are too lazy to walk extra steps.
The turf that she fights for is considered fundamental to the quality of
life of disabled drivers in wheelchairs for those spaces close to the
destination and wide enough to unload wheelchairs are essential for
disabled persons to conduct their daily lives. She views the space of
the handicapped parking space as a right of necessity for the physically
disabled and not as a perk or privilege. Taylor confronts the public by
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challenging dishonest activity (that is, the parking cheat) and the
absence of visibly legitimate qualifications of handicap (that is,
confronting a woman without a limp (or parking sticker)). Taylor issues
citizen-tickets to violators by leaving brightly colored placards on cars
that do not belong in the handicapped parking space in order to expose
them as selfishly inconveniencing the disabled. Her expectation is
that the driver, upon returning to his/her vehicle and finding such a
public and visible marker of shame, will look sheepish and glance around
to see if anyone has noticed.
Another example of the citizen-ticket is that deployed by handicapped
rights activist Matthew Lakota of Chico, California (Chico News and
Review (2004)). In August 2002, Lakota distributed citizen-tickets on
three cars parked in handicapped parking spaces that appeared to visibly
violate that space even though some of those ticketed were actually
disabled but had expiring parking placards. Lakota has gone further
than Taylor in making the leap from social enforcement to legal
enforcement. Drivers ticketed by Lakota paid a total sum of $760, which
was deposited by Lakota into his personal bank account. A different
type of legal enforcement stepped in however, and Lakota was arrested,
charged with impersonating a police officer and attempted extortion. He
was convicted of using phony parking tickets to extort money from
drivers parked in handicapped parking spaces and charged with the
felonies of attempted extortion and receiving stolen property. Ordered
to serve 400 hours of community service and to pay more than $4000 in
fines, Lakotas defence was that he was legally allowed to dispense the
tickets because they are notices of his intent to file civil suit. Lakotas
claim is that legally, he is entitled to socially enforce the handicapped
parking space. Here too, then, the legal and the social begin to seem
indistinguishable from each other. Furthermore, those who were ticketed
actually paid the excessive fines that Lakotas hand-fashioned tickets
demanded: for violators no less than for enforcers, compliance is a
question of more than formal right. Indeed, the fact that some of these
drivers were legally disabled (albeit with expired placards) only further
emphasises the importance of the visible in the shifting sands of legal
and social authority.
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Conclusion: revisiting the ADA
As this paper illustrates, the handicapped parking space is a space that
is reserved for disabled drivers; nevertheless, the twin semiotics of the
Blue Wheelchair, and the actual wheelchair are in normative competition.
The source of this competition is the ADAs own definition of disability.
The use of the word regard results in the legal enforcement of the
display of Blue Wheelchair through ticketing and towing, while the
social enforcement of that driver being in a wheelchair is found in the
disciplining gaze, the towering sign, biopolitical judgments, and the
citizen-ticket.
Not all agree. Thomas Burke views the enforcement of the ADA as
resting solely with legal authorities. Judges, in his formal sense of the
word, ignore the social enforcement of handicapped rights in the
everyday public sphere. His preference for legal recourse within the
parameters of formal litigation dismisses as irrelevant the complex ways
in which law is constituted, interpreted, and enforced every day in
parking lots themselves. In that sense, his claim that the implementation
of the ADA is ultimately in the hands of judges (Burke 2002: 92) is at the
very least problematic. Nevertheless, Burkes assessment that people
with disabilities are oppressed more by society than by their disabilities
is more true than false (Burke 2002: 70). In concluding this examination
of right and might, we must question the fundamental nature of the
ADAs definition of disability and its reliance on the visual representation
of the wheelchair. The wheelchair, as this paper has shown, is a stereotype
of disability. Until the formal use of a wheelchair as the legal semiotic of
disability is changed, the social imaginary it conjures up will also
continue and continue to be enforced  symbols made real in a complex
world, and with real, complex, and sometimes contradictory effects.

Note
1

This paper, originally written for Political Science Professor John Brighams
Issues in Constitutional Law Graduate Seminar, Spring 2004, University
of Massachusetts/Amherst, was presented at the International Roundtable
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for the Semiotics of Law, Montreal, April 2005. I wish to express my
enthusiastic appreciation to both John Brigham and to the Roundtable
participants for their insights, laughter, and encouragement.
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